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Abstract
A model of new-product diﬀusion is proposed in which a site-percolation dynamics represents
socially-driven diﬀusion of knowledge about the product’s characteristics in a population of po-
tential buyers. A consumer buys the new product if her valuation of it is not below the price of the
product announced by the ﬁrm in a given period. Our model attributes the empirical ﬁnding of a
delayed “take-oﬀ” of a new product to a drift of the percolation dynamics from a non-percolating
regime to a percolating regime. This drift is caused by learning-eﬀects lowering the price of the
product, or by network-eﬀects increasing its valuation by consumers, with an increasing number
of buyers.
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Innovation is a central and crucial aspect of the functioning of capitalistic economies (see
Schumpeter (1911, 1942)). In particular, there exists a rich literature analyzing the incen-
tives for industrial innovation, starting with Arrow (1962). In the present paper, however,
we take as given that a new product has emerged and concentrate on the time-proﬁle of its
spread in a population of consumers.
The analysis of the process of adoption of a new product (in the following termed new-
product diﬀusion) constitutes an important research area in both marketing science and
economics. From a practitioner’s perspective, relevant questions are, for instance, how to
forecast whether the new product will “take-oﬀ” (see Garber et al. (2004)), or, once it
did, the level of its future sales depending on the use of elements of the marketing mix (see
e.g. Bass et al. (2000); see also Chandrasekaran and Tellis (2005) for a general overview).
From a more theoretical perspective, one is interested, for instance, in why consumers
develop preferences for new products (see Witt (2001)), or whether such process tend to be
“path-dependent” or “ergodic” (see David (1985)).
Three main approaches to quantitative modeling of the time-proﬁle of new-product
diﬀusion can be distinguished. First, there are phenomenological models of new-product
diﬀusion. This literature starts with Bass (1969). His model has seen numerous reﬁnements
over the years (for an overview, see Mahajan et al. (1990, 1995)), and can reproduce the
evolution of sales over a wide range of the product life cycle employing appropriate para-
meter ﬁts. Second, micro-models of new-product diﬀusion focusing on rational individual
decision-making were proposed (see, for instance, David and Olson (1986, 1992)). These
models typically ascribe to consumers a high degree of sophistication, in particular they
correctly foresee the future evolution of the market. The dynamics of diﬀusion is driven
by the interplay of expectations and maximization. Third, there appeared stochastic mi-
cromodels of new-product diﬀusion which focus on collective eﬀects, often with a myopic
model of decision making. These models are variants of the spatial stochastic process called
percolation1 (see e.g. Allen (1982), Mort (1991), David and Foray (1994), Solomon et al.
(2000), Goldenberg et al. (2000), Silverberg and Verspagen (2002)).
Our present model is percolation-based. It is motivated by the empirical phenomenon
that in the early stages of new-product diﬀusion low levels of sales often persist over a
prolonged period of time before a “take-oﬀ” occurs (for a detailed discussion of this phe-
1For an introduction to percolation and its applications see Stauﬀer and Aharony (1994). An advanced
mathematical treatment of percolation can be found in the monograph by Grimmett (1999).
2nomenon see Golder and Tellis (1997) and Geroski (2003)). Serving as a prototypical
example of this phenomenon, Figure 1 (top) depicts the cumulative number of adopters
of a novel agricultural technique in Iowa in the ﬁrst half of the last century. The data
in Figure 1 (top) is adapted from Ryan and Gross (1943). More examples of long-tailed
diﬀusion curves along with a discussion of the phenomenon of a delayed “take-oﬀ” of new
products can be found in Mort (1991) and Golder and Tellis (1997).
We ﬁnd that our model provides a possible analytical explanation for delayed take-oﬀ
in new-product diﬀusion. It does so with a myopic individual decision-making model, i.e.
avoiding a self-fulﬁlling-prophecy mechanism relying on rational expectations. Up to our
knowledge, it is the ﬁrst model capable of explaining delayed take-oﬀ as a purely collective
coordination phenomenon.2 The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 speciﬁes
the basic model. Section 3 introduces macroscopic feedbacks and shows by Monte Carlo
simulations that the latter can lead to a diﬀusion-dynamics exhibiting a delayed take-oﬀ.
The paper concludes with a brief discussion of some additional aspects of our model.
2 The basic model
We model the process of diﬀusion of a new product3 (the emergence of which is assumed
rather than explained in our model) among a large population of consumers. Time is
discrete. In any period t, a consumer may buy either one unit of the product or none, with
at most one unit bought over the entire time horizon. The individual decision model of
a consumer consists of three steps: ﬁrstly, learning the product’s characteristics, secondly,
forming an individual (subjective) valuation of it, and thirdly, comparing one’s individual
valuation with the price set by the producer.
An essential ingredient of our model is a “spatial” dynamics facilitating individual as-
sessment of the product’s value by each potential buyer. Underlying this dynamics is a
social network – exogenous in the present model4 – which we take to be a two-dimensional
2Delayed take-oﬀ of new products has been explained in the model of David and Olson (1986, 1992) in
the context of rational expectations.
3We believe that our diﬀusion model can be applied to the more general issue of diﬀusion of innovations.
However, that more general context would require a more speciﬁc analysis of the question of why and how
innovations get adopted (see, for instance, Nelson et al. (2004)). In the present paper in the context of a
new product, we conﬁne ourselves to specifying an abstract framework using the notion valuation which is
popular in abstract decision models in economics.
4An interesting question is how such networks emerge in social systems. This question is beyond the
scope of our present investigation, but see, for instance, the paper of Schnegg (2006) for an investigation
of this question in a related context.
3square lattice. It can be represented by a graph, with Z2 as the set of nodes and a link
between any two a,b ∈ Z2 if and only if ||a − b|| = 1, with || · || denoting the Euclidean
distance. In our ﬁnite model, the set of consumers is represented by a ﬁnite square-shaped
subset Λ ⊂ Z2. Two consumers who are directly linked are called nearest neighbors. Each
consumer – except those at the boundary of Λ – has thus four nearest neighbors.
Our particular choice of the network model is presumably not a realistic one. Alas, we
are not aware of empirical studies investigating topologies of interactions in our particular
context, while results of studies investigating sociological network topologies related with
other types of human interactions do not appear to be a-priori transferable (see Schnegg
(2006)). Yet the principle mechanism by which a “take-oﬀ dynamics” is generated in
our model does not depend on the speciﬁc topology of the underlying network (with an
exceptional case to be discussed in the last section of this paper).
In each period, the nearest neighbors of those consumers who bought the product in
the immediately preceding period acquaint themselves with the product.5,6 Based on that
experience they form their individual valuations of the product7 reﬂected in the reservation
price θa (i.e. the highest price at which consumer a would buy). That assumption implies
that it is only via experiencing the product via one’s immediate social environment that a
consumer forms the valuation of it. In that sense, the innovation is “socially transmitted”.
We assume in our model that the transfer of “experience of the product” from one
consumer to another is “neutral” in the sense that the valuation formed by consumer a does
not depend on the valuation of that buyer who triggered the formation of a’s valuation.
Thus we specify that θa is a realization of the random variable Θa with the family (Θa)a∈Λ
independently identically distributed. To directly relate our basic model to the standard
percolation model, each random variable is equi-distributed on [0,1].
Finally, the consumer’s decision to buy the new product is the following: consumer a
buys the product if her individual valuation θa exceeds or equals the price p.
We employ a simple speciﬁcation of the supply side as consisting of a “non-maximizing”
monopolist using mark-up pricing i.e. the price p is given by the formula
p = (1 + m)c (1)
5In the ﬁrst period, the dynamics is initialized by the introduction of a ﬁxed number of early buyers
located randomly in the population. The origin of such “early birds” is exogenous to our model.
6We assume that buyers enable all their nearest neighbors to experience the product corresponding to
the case of pure site-percolation, i.e. bonds are always “open”.
7We assume that the formation of the individual valuation θa is made only once thus it is not reassessed
if in a later period another nearest neighbor of consumer a buys the product.
4with c denoting the unit production costs and m a positive number, the time-constant mark-
up. (See Blinder (1991) and Hall et al. (1997) for empirical evidence that ﬁrms indeed use
mark-up pricing.) In accordance with the speciﬁcation of the range of individual valuations
let us assume that p ∈ [0,1].
The dynamics of the model speciﬁed so far is well-known from the literature on perco-
lation models. In the following we brieﬂy describe some basic properties of these models.
In the simplest case of an (atemporal) site-percolation model with some underlying graph
structure, each site of the graph is randomly assigned a value from {0,1}, with probability
P for a realization of the value 1. The assignment of each value is stochastically indepen-
dent of the values assigned to other sites. Percolation is said to occur if there appears at
least one inﬁnite unbounded cluster8 of sites with value 1. It turns out that there is a
threshold-value for the probability P, denoted by Pc, such that such an inﬁnite cluster of
“active” sites occurs with probability 1 for P > Pc and with probability 0 for P < Pc (see
Stauﬀer and Aharony (1995)). For the particular graph structure speciﬁed in the paper
(two-dimensional square lattice) we have approximately Pc = 0.592743.
To apply Monte-Carlo techniques for the analysis of percolation models, dynamic processes
were proposed enabling to decide whether or not percolation occurs in a given model based
on the behavior of the associated process. For such processes the percolation threshold Pc
corresponds to that value of the probability P above which diﬀusion spreads over the entire
graph with a signiﬁcant probability, and below which it “dies out” unless for extremely rare
instances. The dynamics of our model speciﬁed above corresponds to the Leath-algorithm
of percolation (Leath (1976)).
Let us now return to our particular model context. The probability for a consumer to buy
the product, given she comes to form her valuation (the latter condition is referred to as C),
is the probability that her valuation θa falls into the interval [p,1]. Thus Prob(a buys|C) =
1 − p. According to what was said above, there is in our model a threshold value for the
price p such that for p > pc the diﬀusion of the product will “die out” but will spread
over the population for p < pc. Thus we have pc = 1 − Pc, the numerical value being
approximately 1−Pc = 0.407. A generic time proﬁle of the adoption dynamics of the basic
model is illustrated in Figure 2: percolation occurs for p = 0.39, but does not occur for
p = 0.52. Figure 3 (top) depicts the ﬁnal share of buyers as a function of the price. A
drastic decrease of that share occurs at pc = 0.407.
Note that while the functional form of the time-proﬁle of sales in our model depends
on the particular network structure, the occurrence of spread over the entire population of
8A cluster is a set of connected “occupied” sites.
5consumers depends only on whether the prevailing price p is above or below pc.
In the next section we will extend our basic model by macroscopic feedbacks which
can aﬀect the price or the valuation (or both). It turns out that this feature can produce
a “drift” of the percolation dynamics from a “non-percolating regime” to a “percolating
regime”, thereby facilitating a dynamics corresponding to a delayed “take-oﬀ”.
3 New-product diﬀusion with macroscopic feedbacks
In the following we introduce macroscopic feedbacks aﬀecting the supply side or the demand
side (or both). In the extended model the price and the individual valuation may be time-
dependent such that the general decision rule reads: consumer a buys in t with t ≥ ta
if
θa,t ≥ pt and θa,t < pτ for all τ : ta ≤ τ < t
with ta denoting the time period in which consumer a learns the product’s characteristics
and forms an initial valuation.
We ﬁrst turn to feedback aﬀecting the supply side assuming that unit production costs
decrease with the cumulative quantity of units already produced. The decrease of unit
production costs is empirically well established and explained by learning within the ﬁrm.
Decreasing unit production costs are associated with the “learning curve” (see e.g. Yelle
(1979)) and with the related notion of “economies of scale” (see e.g. Scherer and Ross
(1990)). In our model, the “learning curve” is represented by a functional relationship
ct = f(
Nt−1
N ) with Nt−1 denoting the number of consumers who bought the product up
to period t − 1 and N denoting the total number of consumers. The function f should
satisfy f(x) > 0,f0(x) < 0 and f00(x) > 0 for the non-negative real numbers to comply with
empirical data. Thus, from Eq. 1 follows




We specify feedback aﬀecting the demand side by assuming that for each consumer a
the initial valuation θa is increased by an amount proportional to Nt−1. This eﬀect reﬂects
the notion of “network externalities” increasing the utility of a product with the number of
other adopters (David (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1992)). Taking this eﬀect into account,
we have a time-dependent individual valuation




with some constant µ which we assume to be independent of a. Note that it is not required
that θa,t ∈ [0,1], see Eq. 4.
6Depending on the nature of the product considered, either one of the feedback eﬀects
might vanish. For instance, computer software presumably exhibits only the second kind
of feedback eﬀect, while household electronics exhibit only the ﬁrst.
Note that the two types of macroscopic feedback eﬀects are mathematically equivalent
in the sense that with increasing Nt−1 the existing gaps between the price of the product and
individual valuations of consumers who have not yet bought the product tend to vanish.
For that reason, many qualitative results to not depend upon which type of feedback is
considered.
The probability of buying thus increases over time. Indeed, for a consumer who forms
her evaluation in period t (condition C), the probability to buy in period t we get
Prob(a buys in t|C) =

   
   
1 − pt + µ
Nt−1
N if 0 ≤ 1 − pt + µ
Nt−1
N ≤ 1
0 if 1 − pt + µ
Nt−1
N < 0




Moreover, in each period the decision of a consumer who formed her evaluation in some
earlier period and has not yet bought might be revised. As a result, in our model with
feedbacks there exists a range of initial prices (in the parameter setting depicted in Figure
3 (bottom) between approximately 0.41 and 0.53) for which the product “takes oﬀ” even-
tually, despite it would not take-oﬀ in the basic model of Section 2. For this range of initial
prices, the per-period sales curve exhibits two speciﬁc phases. First, a very low sales level
persists corresponding to the system being in the non-percolating regime. The dynamics
may exhibit a temporary decrease of per-period sales resulting from local diﬀusion seeds
which “die out” before reaching the percolating regime. Second, a “take-oﬀ” phase occur-
ring when diﬀusion seeds which “survived” long enough enter the percolating regime of the
dynamics.
The general principle underlying our model is that the diﬀusion dynamics may “drift”
from the non-percolating regime to the percolating regime. This drift occurs because the
probability of buying increases over time with the cumulative number of buyers. In the
remainder of this section, we present a few instances of such “drift” which were obtained
by Monte Carlo simulations. For simplicity, we maintain the assumption that the initial
individual valuation θa is equi-distributed on [0,1].9 Figure 1 (bottom) depicts a diﬀusion
curve resulting from our model with macroscopic feedback aﬀecting only the demand side
for a setting with one initial buyer in period t = 1, a 400×400 lattice, a time-independent
9With this distribution being, for instance, a truncated normal distribution on [0,1] all qualitative results
were reestablished.
7price p = 0.433 and the parameter µ equal to 0.4. The data is averaged over 500 simulation
runs. The reader may think of this averaged curve as modeling new-product diﬀusion in
a population located in many towns with network externalities aﬀecting the population
within a single town only. A comparison of Figure 1 (top) and (bottom) illustrates that our
model can explain long ﬂat tails empirically observed in the early stages of new-product
diﬀusion.
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of per-period sales (left-hand side) and cumulative sales
(right-hand side) resulting from a speciﬁcation with one initial buyer in period t = 1
on a 400 × 400 lattice. Macroscopic feedback aﬀects the demand side only; the time-
independent price is set to p = 0.435 (top) and p = 0.421 (bottom) and the constant µ
describing the inﬂuence of network externalities equals 0.4. For both prices, the curves are
obtained by averaging over 500 simulation runs. Note that the threshold product price
being approximately 0.407, for both the new product would not spread over the population
in the basic model without macroscopic feedbacks. However, because individual valuations
increase with the number of buyers Nt, some simulation runs persist up to the point where
the additional term in Eq. 3 closes the gap between the average evaluation and the price,
so that spread of the product occurs. The length of the long left tail increases with p and
decreases with µ ceteris paribus. A comparison of Figure 4 (top) with Figure 4 (bottom)
exempliﬁes the ﬁrst part of this statement. Furthermore, the decrease of per period sales
in the ﬁrst phase as visible in Figure 4 (top, left-hand side) increases with increasing price.
Figure 5 depicts three curves corresponding to per-period sales, cumulative sales and
the evolution of the product price resulting from a single simulation run in a setting with
macroscopic feedbacks aﬀecting the supply side only. We specify the time-dependent price
pt (see Eq. 2) as
p(nt−1) = p0 − qnt−1 + αn
2
t−1, (5)
with the fraction of buyers nt−1 =
Nt−1
N , the initial price p0 ∈ [0,1] and q > 0 and α > 0
constant parameters. Figure 5 corresponds to the parameter values q = 0.5, and p0 = 0.52
and α = 0.295. The initial number of buyers equals 3000 and lattice size is 1501 × 1501.
Initial price p0 is set to 0.52.
As Figure 5 demonstrates, the characteristic take-oﬀ dynamics displayed by the averaged
curves of Figure 4 can be obtained from a single simulation run. This fact is signiﬁcant,
because in the case of macroscopic feedbacks aﬀecting the price, sales numbers averaged
over multiple simulation runs are diﬃcult to justify as they would involve diﬀerent price
sequences.
84 Discussion
We conclude with two comments. First, the paper does not propose that the square lattice
is a realistic representation of real-world interaction topologies involved in new-product
diﬀusion. But while the functional form of the time-proﬁle of sales in our model might
depend on the particular underlying topology, the eﬀect of delayed “take-oﬀ” itself does
not: it relies solely on the existence of a percolation threshold pc separating a percolating
regime from a non-percolating regime of the dynamics. It is the passage of the dynamics
from the former to the latter that facilitates the “take-oﬀ” phenomenon.
However, for a certain type of graph structures – called scale-free networks – the per-
colation threshold tends to zero with a growing number of sites (see Cohen et al. (2000)).
Thus, delayed “take-oﬀ” would not occur in our model with a scale-free network represent-
ing the topology of local interactions. It is tempting to empirically test this implication of
our model, once comparative studies on interaction/communication topologies related with
diﬀerent product categories or technologies are available.
Second, in our model individual valuations of the new product made by consumers
are not subject to local social inﬂuence (which is considered, for instance, in the papers by
Goldenberg at al. (2000)) and Solomon et al. (2000)). Rather, we consider only macroscopic
feedbacks (externalities). Again, this is not because we believe that local interaction eﬀects
are not present - interesting phenomena do appear from such local interdependencies in
valuation (see, for instance, Erez et al. (2006)). However in the present model we aim at
explaining the occurrence of delayed take-oﬀ as simply as possible.
References
[1] Allen, B. (1982), Some Stochastic Processes of Interdependent Demand and Technolog-
ical Diﬀusion of an Innovation Exhibiting Externalities Among Adopters, International
Economic Review 23(3), 595-607.
[2] Arrow, K. (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Invention,
in: Richard R. Nelson, ed., The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activities, Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
[3] Bass, F.M. (1969), A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables, Manage-
ment Science 15.
9[4] Bass, F.M. , D. Jain and T. Krishnan (2000), Modelling the Marketing-Mix Inﬂuence in
New Product Diﬀusion, in: New-Product Diﬀusion Models, ed. V. Mahajan, E. Muller
and Y. Wind, Kluver AP
[5] Blinder, A. S. (1991), Why are Prices Sticky? Preliminary Results from an Interview
Study, American Economic Review 81, 89-96.
[6] Chandrasekaran, Deepa and Gerard J Tellis (2005), Diﬀusion of New Products: A
Critical Review of Models, Drivers, and Findings, Review of Marketing, forthcoming.
[7] R. Cohen, K. Erez, D. ben-Avraham, and S. Havlin (2000) Resilience of the Internet
to random breakdowns, Physical Review Letters 85, 4626.
[8] David, P.A. (1985), Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, American Economic Review
75, 332-337.
[9] David, P.A. and Foray D. (1994), Percolation structures, Markov Random Fields and
the Economics of EDI standards, in: G. Pogorel, (ed.) Global Telecommunications
Strategies and Technological Changes, Elsevier Science B.V.
[10] David, P.A. and Olsen T. E. (1986) Equilibrium dynamics of diﬀusion when incremental
technological innovations are foreseen Richerche Economiche, 40(4).
[11] David, P.A. and Olsen T. E. (1992) Technology adoption, learning spillovers, and
the optimal duration of patent-based monopolies International Journal of Industrial
Organization, Volume 10, Issue 4 , December 1992, 517-543.
[12] Erez T., S. Moldovan and S. Solomon (2006), Social Percolation and Negative Word
of Mouth, in Handbook of Research on Nature Inspired Computing for Economy and
Management, Jean-Philippe Rennard (ed.), forthcoming
[13] Garber, T., J. Goldenberg, B. Libai and E. Muller (2004), From Density to Destiny:
Using Spatial Analysis for Early Prediction of New Product Success, Marketing Sci-
ence, Vol. 23, 3, 419-29.
[14] Geroski, P. (2003), The Early Evolution of Markets, Oxford University Press
[15] Goldenberg, J, B. Libai, S. Solomon, N. Jan and D. Stauﬀer (2000), Marketing perco-
lation, Physica A 284 (1-4) pp. 335-347.
[16] Golder, P.N. and G.J. Tellis (1997), Will It Ever Fly? Modelling the Takeoﬀ of Really
New Consumer Durables, Marketing Science 16 (3), 253-270.
[17] Grimmett, G. (1999), Percolation, 2nd ed., Springer
[18] Gort, M. and Klepper, S. (1982), Time Paths in the Diﬀusion of Product Innovations,
Economic Journal 92, 630-653
10[19] Hall, S., Walsh, M. and Yates, A. (1997), How do UK Companies set Prices ?,Bank of
England Working Papers 67
[20] Katz M.L. and C. Shapiro (1992), Product Introduction with Network Externalities,
Journal of Industrial Economics 40, 55-84.
[21] Leath, P.L. (1976), Cluster size and boundary distribution near percolation threshold,
Physical Review B 14, pp. 5047-5056.
[22] Mahajan, V., Muller, E. and Bass, F.M. (1990), New Product Diﬀusion Models in
Marketing: A Review and Directions for Research, Journal of Marketing 54, 1-26.
[23] Mahajan, V., Muller, E. and Bass, F.M. (1995), Diﬀusion of new products: empirical
generalizations and managerial uses, Marketing Science 14(3) Part 2, G79-G88.
[24] Mort, J. (1991), Perspective: The Applicability of Percolation Theory to Innovation,
Journal of Product Innovation Management 8, pp.32-38.
[25] Nelson, R. R., Peterhansl, A and Sampat, B. (2004), Why and how Innovations get
adopted: a tale of four models, Industrial and Corporate Change 13(5), 679-699.
[26] Ryan, B. and Gross N.C. (1943), The Diﬀusion of Hybrid Seed Corn In Two Iowa
Communities, Rural Sociology 8, 15-24.
[27] Scherer, F.M. and Ross, D. (1990), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Perfor-
mance, 3rd edition, Houghton Miﬄin
[28] Schumpeter, J (1911) Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Berlin 1911
[29] Schumpeter, J (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York 1942
[30] Schnegg, M. (2006) Reciprocity and the Emergence of Power Laws in Social Networks,
International Journal of Modern Physics C 17.
[31] Silverberg G. and Verspagen B. (2005), A Percolation Model of Innovation in Complex
Technology Spaces , Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 29, 225-244.
[32] Solomon, S., G. Weisbuch, L. de Arcangelis, N. Jan and D. Stauﬀer Social percolation
models, Physica A 277 (1-2) (2000) 239-247
[33] Stauﬀer, D. and Aharony, A. (1994), Introduction to Percolation Theory, 2nd ed.,
Taylor and Francis
[34] Witt, U. (2001), Learning to Consume - A Theory of Wants and Demand Growth,
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol.11, 23-36.
[35] Yelle, L.E. (1979), The Learning Curve: Historical Review and Comprehensive Survey,



















































































Figure 1: Cumulative frequency of adopters for the diﬀusion of hybrid corn seed in two
Iowa farming communities adapted from [26] (top); cumulative number of buyers in our
model with the parameter values p = 0.433 and µ = 0.4 (bottom).






























































































































































































Figure 2: Per-period number of buyers (left-hand side) and cumulative frequencies of buyers
over time (right-hand side) in the basic model of Section 2; percolation occurs for a price
p=0.39 (top) but does not occur for p=0.52 (bottom); initial number of buyers equals 3000.


















































































Figure 3: Total (ﬁnal) share of buyers as a function of price in the basic model of Section
2 (top); total (ﬁnal) share of buyers as a function of initial price in the model with supply-
side-feedbacks (bottom), see Figure 5 for the corresponding time-proﬁles. Delayed take-oﬀ
occurs for initial prices in the range enclosed by the two dashed lines, that is for initial

































































































































Figure 4: Per-period number of buyers (left-hand side) and cumulative number of buyers
(right-hand side) in our model with parameter values p = 0.435 and µ = 0.4 (top) and
























































































Figure 5: Per-period number of buyers (top), cumulative number of buyers (middle) and
the evolution of price (bottom) in our model with macroscopic feedback aﬀecting supply
side only; initial price is p0 = 0.52.
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